Pre-war advice was no new WMDs
The Australian via NEWS.com.au -- 18 February 2004
By Cameron Stewart
AUSTRALIA'S spy agencies told the Government before the Iraq war there was no evidence that Saddam Hussein was building new chemical and biological weapons.
But Australian intelligence agencies did conclude - wrongly - that Saddam's regime harboured a modest stockpile of useable illicit weapons left over from the 1990-91 Gulf War.
The Government used this key assessment as the basis for war, arguing that Iraq's possession of these WMDs posed a "real and unacceptable threat".
However, the spy agencies also issued caveats on this assessment, saying Iraq's WMDs were likely to be limited in number and in poor condition
As pressure mounts for an independent inquiry into intelligence on Iraq, The Australian has confirmed key aspects of what the country's spy agencies told the Government in the weeks before war.
Australian spy agencies were significantly more cautious than their US and British counterparts, but still made the key mistake of overestimating Iraq's WMD capability.
Of the two Australian agencies providing intelligence assessments on Iraq, the Defence Intelligence Organisation was more sceptical about Iraq's capabilities than was the Prime Minister's assessment agency, the Office of National Assessments.
The Australian understands that both the DIO and ONA told the Government that:
In several instances, senior government ministers echoed public claims made by US President George W.Bush and his British counterpart Tony Blair about Iraq's WMDs before Australian agencies had a chance to assess the claims independently.
However, it is understood that Australian agencies did not caution against such comments, before or after they were made.
As one source said: "We may need to be more proactive next time."
A parliamentary joint committee examining the intelligence received on Iraq is due to release its findings on March 1.
It is expected to distribute blame across the spectrum, criticising Australian agencies for overestimating the WMD threat.
The Government is also expected to be criticised, but will not be accused of deliberately misrepresenting - or "sexing up" - the intelligence available to it.
Labor is calling for a larger independent inquiry on intelligence with the powers of a royal commission.
The Government is expected to call a broader inquiry into intelligence on Iraq shortly after the parliamentary report is tabled.
The push for a broader inquiry reflects concerns that the parliamentary committee was not given enough time or access to key intelligence to make conclusive findings.
The Australian understands that committee members were given access to the classified final ONA and DIO analysis on Iraq in the lead-up to war.
But they were not given access to the raw material upon which those assessments were based, for fear that sources might be compromised.
The committee was, however, able to compare and contrast the final ONA and DIO assessments with the public comments made by John Howard and his senior ministers in the lead-up to war.
Bush Says His View of Iraq Threat Was Widely Held
Reuters -- February 17, 2004
By Steve Holland
FORT POLK, La. - President Bush on Tuesday sought to blunt criticism he exaggerated prewar intelligence by saying his conclusion that Iraq had banned weapons was shared by the U.S. Congress and the U.N. Security Council.
Weapons 'capacity' of Iraq challenged
Boston Globe -- February 17, 2004
By Charlie Savage, Globe Staff
WASHINGTON -- Prewar Iraq was highly unlikely to produce a device that could easily inflict mass casualties -- despite President Bush's current assertion that Saddam Hussein had the "capacity" to make a weapon of mass destruction, former weapons inspectors and former national security officials say.
Bush's assertion about Iraq's capabilities, which he made repeatedly during his interview last week on the NBC television program "Meet the Press," is a central prong of his administration's defense that the war was justified despite the failure to find stockpiles of unconventional weapons. It is a theme to which Bush is likely to return often in this election year. And it marks Bush's first characterization of the Iraq threat since the testimony of his former chief weapons inspector, David Kay.
"David Kay did report to the American people that Saddam had the capacity to make weapons," Bush said. "Saddam Hussein was dangerous with weapons. Saddam Hussein was dangerous with the ability to make weapons."
But Kay did not describe Iraq's production capacity so clearly in either his interim public report last fall or in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Jan. 28. In an interview last week, he told the Globe that although Iraq had pesticide equipment that could be switched to produce fine-grain anthrax in a lab, it would have remained a challenge to deliver it in a way that would inflict mass casualties.
"I think it's fair to say they had the capacity [to switch over to anthrax production], but you're always going to get into the issue of not just producing an agent, but in a usable way," Kay said. "The real trick is delivery in a way that gets to you in a way that is inhaled -- aerosolized. That is much more difficult."
Moreover, although Hussein employed scientists who had once been working on military programs, Kay found that almost all of Iraq's infrastructure for nuclear and chemical weapons production was destroyed during the 1991 Gulf War and by United Nations inspectors.
He cited the pesticide lab equipment as among his most potentially worrisome findings, but Kay testified last month that he considered the possibility that an Iraqi scientist might sell the know-how on the black market "a bigger risk than the restart of [Hussein's] programs being successful."
Many specialists described even weapons-grade anthrax as more of a weapon of mass "disruption" because it is difficult to keep it in the air and it is not contagious, limiting its ability to inflict wide damage.
Vincent Cannistraro, a former head of the CIA's counterterrorism unit and a former director of intelligence for the National Security Council, noted that Bush has been accused of exaggerating intelligence before the war by taking shards of analysis that included conditions and hedged suspicions about what Iraq might be harboring -- then representing it as a certainty.
Cannistraro said Bush's description of Kay's postwar findings is also a questionably aggressive interpretation of the evidence.
"It's not as flatly wrong, but it is misleading," Cannistraro said. "To translate knowledge . . . to capability, that's inaccurate because knowledge can be, `Yeah, I know how to do this.' But having the capability of doing this requires the acquisition of a lot of component parts you don't have."
Sean McCormack, a National Security Council spokesman, said Bush's assertion was based on portions of Kay's interim report in which the inspector said he had found evidence of "weapons of mass destruction-related program activities."
"One question is, `How close [to making a weapon] do you want them to be able to be?' " McCormack said.
"Clearly, the president and policy makers have to make judgments about threat and risk. And they had to make judgments about Saddam Hussein, who had shown that he would use weapons of mass destruction and that he was intent on building and acquiring them. This regime was sitting in the middle of one of the most unstable regions in the world."
Nonetheless, several specialists on weapons of mass destruction who have studied Kay's findings said Bush's insistence that Iraq had the "capacity" to make such a weapon -- not just the goal of eventually building one -- is accurate only in the loosest sense of the word.
"There are easily ways in which that would be a true statement and easily ways in which it could be a stretch," said Gerald Epstein, a former assistant director for national security at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. "It all depends on the squishy word `capacity.' Almost everything is dual-use technology -- there is biotech all over the world that is not much different than what you'd need to produce a weapon. But does that mean having everything ready to go for a military attack using that weapon? No, that's very different."
Asked to respond to Bush's characterization of his findings, Kay agreed that one could say Iraq had the "capacity," but he also described this as a "really mushy" question and added a series of significant qualifiers that Bush did not mention.
"Did they have the capacity to make a small number of chemicial or biological weapons using existing civilian infrastructure? Sure," Kay said. "Look, if some nut can make enough anthrax to terrorize us in very small amounts, Iraq could have made some. That's different than saying it could have made large amounts of weaponized anthrax that would have been useful in a militarized conflict."
Kay also reported that on at least two occasions, Hussein or his sons asked scientists how long it would take to produce mustard or VX nerve gas. The scientists answered that they could make mustard gas in several months but that VX would take several years. But Kay also reported that many of the dictator's scientists had been lying to him while collecting funding.
Kay said that because the order was never given, "we can't be sure" whether they could make a useful chemcial weapon.
He also said his investigation had looked into whether Iraq possessed the chemical ingredients needed to make mustard or VX gas, with varying results.
"They probably had adequate precursors for mustard gas," he said. "For VX, they faced certain problems, and they were working on how they could find solutions in their own indigenous production."
The pesticide laboratory Kay found was working with Bt, a substance that closely mirrored the properties of anthrax.
He said the Bt equipment could have been converted into producing fine-grain anthrax powder -- if Iraqi scientists were able to find a virulent strain to seed a batch.
But even if the Bt equipment were retrofitted to mill anthrax spores, analysts said, it would have been extremely difficult to deliver the agent in a way that would yield mass casualties rather than several deaths -- such as the anthrax mailing attacks in 2001 that killed five people.
And Kay said delivery problems are multiplied for chemical weapons because a much greater volume is needed.
Before the war, the Bush administration said Iraq was working on unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with sprayers that could have been part of an airborne delivery system. But Kay's investigation found that the vehicles were designed for surveillance only.
Kay's report conceded Iraq had restarted a longer-range missile program, and in the interview he noted that Iraq's history of having produced unconventional weapons in the past would have made it easier to make them again.
But Jonathan Tucker, a former Iraq inspector for the UN, said an enormous distance remains between that evidence and the implication that Hussein would have been able to produce new weapons of mass destruction.
"It would be inaccurate to say they had a rapid breakout capability," he said.
"It would be accurate to say they were continuing some research and development in some areas related to WMD with the long-range intention of having the capacity to rebuild their programs when sanctions were lifted.
"With chemical and nuclear, it would take them years to rebuild production capacity. In biological, they had the production infrastructure because of dual-use technology, but they didn't necessarily have the capacity for weaponization."
© Copyright 2004 Globe Newspaper Company.
Iraq: Prewar Intelligence Said Weapons Of Mass Destruction Would Be Hard To Find
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty via Truth News -- February 17, 2004
CIA Intelligence Reports Seven Months Before 9/11 Said Iraq Posed No Threat To U.S., Containment Was Working
Common Dreams -- February 17, 2004
Govt prepares for new WMD probe
The Age -- 17 February 2004
[Excerpt.]
The federal government appeared to prepare the ground for a new inquiry into the pre-war intelligence it received about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said the government would consider a new inquiry if it is recommended in a parliamentary committee report to be published on March 1.
It is an open secret, following a series of leaks, that the committee will recommend another inquiry.
The Blame Game
Bush and the MIA WMDs
The Nation -- February 12, 2004
Talking Points – Iraq's WMD
US Department of Defense via Josh Marshall -- Feb. 12, 2004
PM resists WMD probe pressure
ABC News Online (Australia) -- 12 February 2004
[Excerpt]
The Prime Minister says he still wants to wait until a parliamentary committee reports on pre-war intelligence on Iraq's banned weapons program before deciding if he will set up an independent inquiry into the matter.
The Federal Opposition has called on Prime Minister John Howard to reveal if the Government has already made its decision.
Q & A with Congresswoman Jane Harman
Center for American Progress -- February 11, 2004
[Tom Tomorrow had some comments about this story.]
Rumsfeld 'unaware' of WMD claim
BBC News -- 11 February 2004
The 45-minute claim was publicised in the run-up to war
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says he cannot remember hearing the claim that Iraq could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes.
Powell defends war, says he expected WMD
AP via Seattle Post-Intelligencer -- February 11, 2004
[Excerpt]
By BARRY SCHWEID
AP DIPLOMATIC WRITER
WASHINGTON -- Under attack by House Democrats, Secretary of State Colin Powell said Wednesday he was surprised U.N. and American inspectors did not find storehouses of hidden weapons in Iraq.
[Have they considered Craig's List?]
CIA Web site notice seeks Iraq WMD information
Reuters -- 11 February 2004
[Excerpt]
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The CIA, under fire over its intelligence about Iraq's arms programs, has posted a notice on its Web site offering rewards for information on the elusive weapons.
The "Iraqi Rewards Program" notice dated Tuesday seeks "specific and verifiable information" on the location of stocks of "recently made" chemical or biological weapons, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles or their components.
[Another Bush canard bites the dust.]
Libya decided 10 years ago against developing WMD, Foreign Minister says
The Independent -- 11 February 2004
By Mary Dejevsky
Libya decided more than 10 years ago not to develop any weapons of mass destruction, Abdul Rahman Shalgam, its Foreign Minister said yesterday.
His appeared to contradict the co-ordinated announcements in London, Washington and Tripoli last December that Libya was renouncing its WMDs and would comply with international inspection regimes. Despite the reports that Libya would destroy its illegal weapons and programmes, it was not clear then how advanced Libya's programmes were and whether it had actual weapons to destroy.
The first doubts were cast by Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the IAEA, who said after visiting Tripoli that Libya was several years from developing a nuclear capability. Yesterday Mr Shalgam said it was not true that Libya had made "concessions". This was a view put about by "poisonous" pens in the Arab media. Libya, he said, "reviewed a number of issues, including programmes and equipment called weapons of mass destruction.
"We had the equipment, we had the material and the know-how and the scientists. But we never decided to produce such weapons. To have flour, water and fire does not mean that you have bread."
Libya's renunciation of such weapons, he said, went back to at least 1992, since when it had been in periodic talks with the US, and was well-documented. Mr Shalgam insisted it was Libya that had taken the initiative in renouncing its weapons programmes and it would be subject not to "inspections" but to "verification".
He admitted Libya had possessed "some equipment" that violated the non-proliferation agreement, but this had already been given up to the IAEA. Any suggestion that Libya had been scared into making concessions by the US and British use of force in Iraq had been put about by "malevolent journalists". Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, asked whether the war in Iraq was seen by the British Government as responsible for Libya's apparent change of policy on its weapons, pointed out that the rapprochement with Libya had begun in the late Nineties.
The "breakthrough" had come with the visit of the Foreign Office minister, Mike O'Brien, to Tripoli 18 months ago, "a good while before military action was contemplated in respect of Iraq". But, he insisted, he would not "claim any crude connection ... between military action in Iraq and what has happened in Iraq and in Libya".
It was rather, he said, that the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq had made for a "more secure environment" in the region and this, in turn, could have "eased" the delicate negotiations with Libya.
© 2004 Independent Digital (UK) Ltd
Koizumi backs off on WMD
The Asahi Shimbun -- 11 February 2004
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, like his good friend U.S. President George W. Bush, increasingly finds himself painted into a corner over the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq.
Koizumi was anything but convincing in his responses to questions Monday in a session of the Upper House special committee on Iraq's reconstruction and military emergency laws.
``We cannot at present say firmly that Iraq does not have WMD,'' Koizumi said. ``The rationale for supporting the war has not been lost.''
However, perhaps realizing he was standing on shifting sands, Koizumi added that a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions that Iraq ignored was reason enough to go to war against Baghdad.
Koizumi's responses to questions about the rationale for supporting the war have undergone changes in nuance during the current Diet session.
He has increasingly referred to the United Nations to back up his reasoning for supporting the U.S.-led war. In a Feb. 4 Upper House Budget Committee hearing, he referred to the United Nations at least five times.
Last March, at the start of the conflict, Koizumi gave two major reasons for supporting the United States: Iraqi's suspected possession of WMD and the series of U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iraq since the Persian Gulf War of 1991.
More recently, however, Koizumi has avoided referring to WMD in depth. This has been especially evident since congressional testimony in late January by David Kay, who headed the U.S. weapons inspection team in Iraq and found no evidence of WMD.
In Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair also faces an increasingly hostile and skeptical audience on this issue.
With one leg of his two-pronged argument supporting the U.S. action against Iraq effectively cut from under him, Koizumi has no choice but to stress the other leg in discussions in the Diet.
He has increasingly referred to the U.N. Charter, which allows the use of force in cases of self-defense and in response to U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Despite the recent change in his emphasis on the United Nations, Koizumi clearly places greater importance on Japan's alliance with the United States when presenting his arguments for supporting the war.
Analysts said a comment Koizumi made Jan. 27 at the Lower House Budget Committee probably demonstrates his feelings on the issue.
``The U.N. will not extend a hand of support if Japan faced a crisis,'' Koizumi said, indicating this country can only depend on the United States. (02/11)
Generals Say They Believed Iraq Had WMD
AP via Sarasota Herald-Tribune -- February 10, 2004
[Excerpt]
PAULINE JELINEK
WASHINGTON - The generals who head the nation's military services said Tuesday they were convinced before the invasion of Iraq that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.
In their first joint testimony since the war began, the chiefs of the Air Force, Navy and Marines stood by the decision to invade, even though intelligence used to justify the campaign apparently turned out wrong.
Marine Commandant Gen. Michael Hagee told the Senate Armed Services Committee he was "absolutely convinced" during the war planning stage that Saddam "had chemical weapons, if not biological weapons, and that he would use them" as soon as American troops crossed over the Iraqi border.
Russia proved right on Iraq WMD
Reuters via Aljazeera.net -- 10 February 2004
Russia's UN ambassador said late on Monday his country was never sure Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, despite assertions from former US arms inspector David Kay that "we were almost all wrong."
Russian Ambassador Sergei Lavrov, at his annual meeting with the press, said Russian officials repeatedly maintained they did not have enough information.
"We said that we don't have information which would prove that the WMD, weapons of mass destruction, programmes remain in Iraq. We also said we don't have information that those programmes have been fully stopped," Lavrov said.
Consequently, he said he supported a Security Council resolution in November 2002 giving "an unprecedented, intrusive mandate to UN inspectors and that is why we wanted the inspectors to finish their job."
After Kay told Congress on 28 January, "we were almost all wrong," many US and British officials said members of the UN Security Council, as well as United Nations inspectors, got it wrong also.
Russia opposed the war and at one time was Iraq's closest ally on the Security Council. Lavrov said Moscow believed UN inspectors provided an objective evaluation.
Lavrov said the current UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, known as UNMOVIC, could perhaps analyse any information the United States weapons hunters found.
"If remnants are there, could be revived, we want to make sure they are eliminated. We don't want some wrong groups in Iraq to lay their hands on WMD in Iraq, if there are any," Lavrov said.
But he said Iraq could not be a long-term job for UNMOVIC. Solutions should be found to retain the expertise of the commission, particularly on biological arms and ballistic missiles, for which there were no international inspection mechanisms.
Defence Expert Fears Public Backlash on Wmd Threat
The Scotsman -- 10 February 2004
By Gavin Cordon, Whitehall Editor, PA News
A retired intelligence official who gave key evidence to the Hutton Inquiry warned today that efforts to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction could be undermined by “false expectations” raised about Iraq’s arsenal.
Dr Bryan Jones, the former head of the branch in the Defence Intelligence Staff looking at nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, said he did not expect any weapons stockpiles to be discovered in Iraq.
In an interview with The Independent, he said the intelligence assessment before the war which included the controversial 45 minute claim had merely outlined “possible scenarios” rather than detailing any specific threat.
“The fact was, it was so nebulous that there was nothing you could really hang your hat on,” he said.
We Had Good Intel—The U.N.'s
Newsweek via MSNBC -- February 9, 2004