The Blame Game
Bush and the MIA WMDs
The Nation -- February 12, 2004
Talking Points – Iraq's WMD
US Department of Defense via Josh Marshall -- Feb. 12, 2004
PM resists WMD probe pressure
ABC News Online (Australia) -- 12 February 2004
[Excerpt]
The Prime Minister says he still wants to wait until a parliamentary committee reports on pre-war intelligence on Iraq's banned weapons program before deciding if he will set up an independent inquiry into the matter.
The Federal Opposition has called on Prime Minister John Howard to reveal if the Government has already made its decision.
Q & A with Congresswoman Jane Harman
Center for American Progress -- February 11, 2004
[Tom Tomorrow had some comments about this story.]
Rumsfeld 'unaware' of WMD claim
BBC News -- 11 February 2004
The 45-minute claim was publicised in the run-up to war
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says he cannot remember hearing the claim that Iraq could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes.
Powell defends war, says he expected WMD
AP via Seattle Post-Intelligencer -- February 11, 2004
[Excerpt]
By BARRY SCHWEID
AP DIPLOMATIC WRITER
WASHINGTON -- Under attack by House Democrats, Secretary of State Colin Powell said Wednesday he was surprised U.N. and American inspectors did not find storehouses of hidden weapons in Iraq.
[Have they considered Craig's List?]
CIA Web site notice seeks Iraq WMD information
Reuters -- 11 February 2004
[Excerpt]
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The CIA, under fire over its intelligence about Iraq's arms programs, has posted a notice on its Web site offering rewards for information on the elusive weapons.
The "Iraqi Rewards Program" notice dated Tuesday seeks "specific and verifiable information" on the location of stocks of "recently made" chemical or biological weapons, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles or their components.
[Another Bush canard bites the dust.]
Libya decided 10 years ago against developing WMD, Foreign Minister says
The Independent -- 11 February 2004
By Mary Dejevsky
Libya decided more than 10 years ago not to develop any weapons of mass destruction, Abdul Rahman Shalgam, its Foreign Minister said yesterday.
His appeared to contradict the co-ordinated announcements in London, Washington and Tripoli last December that Libya was renouncing its WMDs and would comply with international inspection regimes. Despite the reports that Libya would destroy its illegal weapons and programmes, it was not clear then how advanced Libya's programmes were and whether it had actual weapons to destroy.
The first doubts were cast by Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the IAEA, who said after visiting Tripoli that Libya was several years from developing a nuclear capability. Yesterday Mr Shalgam said it was not true that Libya had made "concessions". This was a view put about by "poisonous" pens in the Arab media. Libya, he said, "reviewed a number of issues, including programmes and equipment called weapons of mass destruction.
"We had the equipment, we had the material and the know-how and the scientists. But we never decided to produce such weapons. To have flour, water and fire does not mean that you have bread."
Libya's renunciation of such weapons, he said, went back to at least 1992, since when it had been in periodic talks with the US, and was well-documented. Mr Shalgam insisted it was Libya that had taken the initiative in renouncing its weapons programmes and it would be subject not to "inspections" but to "verification".
He admitted Libya had possessed "some equipment" that violated the non-proliferation agreement, but this had already been given up to the IAEA. Any suggestion that Libya had been scared into making concessions by the US and British use of force in Iraq had been put about by "malevolent journalists". Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, asked whether the war in Iraq was seen by the British Government as responsible for Libya's apparent change of policy on its weapons, pointed out that the rapprochement with Libya had begun in the late Nineties.
The "breakthrough" had come with the visit of the Foreign Office minister, Mike O'Brien, to Tripoli 18 months ago, "a good while before military action was contemplated in respect of Iraq". But, he insisted, he would not "claim any crude connection ... between military action in Iraq and what has happened in Iraq and in Libya".
It was rather, he said, that the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq had made for a "more secure environment" in the region and this, in turn, could have "eased" the delicate negotiations with Libya.
© 2004 Independent Digital (UK) Ltd
Koizumi backs off on WMD
The Asahi Shimbun -- 11 February 2004
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, like his good friend U.S. President George W. Bush, increasingly finds himself painted into a corner over the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq.
Koizumi was anything but convincing in his responses to questions Monday in a session of the Upper House special committee on Iraq's reconstruction and military emergency laws.
``We cannot at present say firmly that Iraq does not have WMD,'' Koizumi said. ``The rationale for supporting the war has not been lost.''
However, perhaps realizing he was standing on shifting sands, Koizumi added that a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions that Iraq ignored was reason enough to go to war against Baghdad.
Koizumi's responses to questions about the rationale for supporting the war have undergone changes in nuance during the current Diet session.
He has increasingly referred to the United Nations to back up his reasoning for supporting the U.S.-led war. In a Feb. 4 Upper House Budget Committee hearing, he referred to the United Nations at least five times.
Last March, at the start of the conflict, Koizumi gave two major reasons for supporting the United States: Iraqi's suspected possession of WMD and the series of U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iraq since the Persian Gulf War of 1991.
More recently, however, Koizumi has avoided referring to WMD in depth. This has been especially evident since congressional testimony in late January by David Kay, who headed the U.S. weapons inspection team in Iraq and found no evidence of WMD.
In Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair also faces an increasingly hostile and skeptical audience on this issue.
With one leg of his two-pronged argument supporting the U.S. action against Iraq effectively cut from under him, Koizumi has no choice but to stress the other leg in discussions in the Diet.
He has increasingly referred to the U.N. Charter, which allows the use of force in cases of self-defense and in response to U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Despite the recent change in his emphasis on the United Nations, Koizumi clearly places greater importance on Japan's alliance with the United States when presenting his arguments for supporting the war.
Analysts said a comment Koizumi made Jan. 27 at the Lower House Budget Committee probably demonstrates his feelings on the issue.
``The U.N. will not extend a hand of support if Japan faced a crisis,'' Koizumi said, indicating this country can only depend on the United States. (02/11)
Generals Say They Believed Iraq Had WMD
AP via Sarasota Herald-Tribune -- February 10, 2004
[Excerpt]
PAULINE JELINEK
WASHINGTON - The generals who head the nation's military services said Tuesday they were convinced before the invasion of Iraq that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.
In their first joint testimony since the war began, the chiefs of the Air Force, Navy and Marines stood by the decision to invade, even though intelligence used to justify the campaign apparently turned out wrong.
Marine Commandant Gen. Michael Hagee told the Senate Armed Services Committee he was "absolutely convinced" during the war planning stage that Saddam "had chemical weapons, if not biological weapons, and that he would use them" as soon as American troops crossed over the Iraqi border.
Russia proved right on Iraq WMD
Reuters via Aljazeera.net -- 10 February 2004
Russia's UN ambassador said late on Monday his country was never sure Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, despite assertions from former US arms inspector David Kay that "we were almost all wrong."
Russian Ambassador Sergei Lavrov, at his annual meeting with the press, said Russian officials repeatedly maintained they did not have enough information.
"We said that we don't have information which would prove that the WMD, weapons of mass destruction, programmes remain in Iraq. We also said we don't have information that those programmes have been fully stopped," Lavrov said.
Consequently, he said he supported a Security Council resolution in November 2002 giving "an unprecedented, intrusive mandate to UN inspectors and that is why we wanted the inspectors to finish their job."
After Kay told Congress on 28 January, "we were almost all wrong," many US and British officials said members of the UN Security Council, as well as United Nations inspectors, got it wrong also.
Russia opposed the war and at one time was Iraq's closest ally on the Security Council. Lavrov said Moscow believed UN inspectors provided an objective evaluation.
Lavrov said the current UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, known as UNMOVIC, could perhaps analyse any information the United States weapons hunters found.
"If remnants are there, could be revived, we want to make sure they are eliminated. We don't want some wrong groups in Iraq to lay their hands on WMD in Iraq, if there are any," Lavrov said.
But he said Iraq could not be a long-term job for UNMOVIC. Solutions should be found to retain the expertise of the commission, particularly on biological arms and ballistic missiles, for which there were no international inspection mechanisms.
Defence Expert Fears Public Backlash on Wmd Threat
The Scotsman -- 10 February 2004
By Gavin Cordon, Whitehall Editor, PA News
A retired intelligence official who gave key evidence to the Hutton Inquiry warned today that efforts to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction could be undermined by “false expectations” raised about Iraq’s arsenal.
Dr Bryan Jones, the former head of the branch in the Defence Intelligence Staff looking at nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, said he did not expect any weapons stockpiles to be discovered in Iraq.
In an interview with The Independent, he said the intelligence assessment before the war which included the controversial 45 minute claim had merely outlined “possible scenarios” rather than detailing any specific threat.
“The fact was, it was so nebulous that there was nothing you could really hang your hat on,” he said.
We Had Good Intel—The U.N.'s
Newsweek via MSNBC -- February 9, 2004
Report: Al-Qaida has obtained tactical nuclear explosives
Ha'aretz -- February 9, 2004
By Yoav Stern, Haaretz Correspondent, and Haaretz Service
Al-Qaida has possessed tactical nuclear weapons for about six years, the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper reported Sunday.
The Arabic daily reported that sources close to Al-Qaida said Osama bin Laden's group bought the nuclear weapons from Ukrainian scientists who were visiting Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 1998.
The report has not been confirmed
Public, classified versions of Iraq intelligence report differed
Knight Ridder Washington Bureau -- February 9, 2004
WASHINGTON - Following are excerpts from the public and classified versions of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons capabilities.The first set of quotes under each topic is from the public version, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," which was released by the CIA in October 2002. The second set is from the classified version of the NIE, portions of which were declassified and released by the White House in July 2003.
---
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
"Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon within this decade." -public version.
"We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon within this decade. (See INR alternative view at the end of these Key Judgments.)" -classified version.
"Iraq hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts." -public version.
"We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts. ... We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD programs." -classified version.
---
NUCLEAR PROGRAM
" ... most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program." -public version.
"The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programs, INR is unwilling to ... project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening." -classified version, "State/INR Alternative View of Iraq's Nuclear Program."
---
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
"Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland." -public version.
"We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.
"... Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington with a stronger case for making war.
"Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the US Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge.
" ... we have no specific intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against US territory."-classified version.
---
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
"Baghdad's UAVs - especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents - could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland." -public version.
" ... The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, US Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability." -classified version.
[An analysis of classified vs. public versions of the assessments of intelligence on Iraq.]
Doubts, dissent stripped from public version of Iraq assessment
Knight-Ridder Washington Bureau -- February 9, 2004
By Jonathan S. Landay
WASHINGTON - The public version of the U.S. intelligence community's key prewar assessment of Iraq's illicit arms programs was stripped of dissenting opinions, warnings of insufficient information and doubts about deposed dictator Saddam Hussein's intentions, a review of the document and its once-classified version shows.
As a result, the public was given a far more definitive assessment of Iraq's plans and capabilities than President Bush and other U.S. decision-makers received from their intelligence agencies.
The stark differences between the public version and the then top-secret version of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate raise new questions about the accuracy of the public case made for a war that's claimed the lives of more than 500 U.S. service members and thousands of Iraqis.
The two documents are replete with differences. For example, the public version declared that "most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program" and says "if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon within this decade."
But it fails to mention the dissenting view offered in the top-secret version by the State Department's intelligence arm, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, known as the INR.
That view said, in part, "The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment."
The alternative view further said "INR is unwilling to ... project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening."
Both versions were written by the National Intelligence Council, a board of senior analysts who report to CIA Director George Tenet and prepare reports on crucial national security issues. Stuart Cohen, a 30-year CIA veteran, was the NIC's acting chairman at the time.
The CIA didn't respond officially to requests to explain the differences in the two versions. But a senior intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity, explained them by saying a more candid public version could have revealed U.S. intelligence-gathering methods.
Last week, Tenet defended the intelligence community's reporting on Iraq, telling an audience at Georgetown University that differences over Iraq's capabilities "were spelled out" in the October 2002 intelligence estimate.
But while top U.S. officials may have been told of differences among analysts, those disputes were kept from the American public in key areas, including whether Saddam was stockpiling biological and chemical weapons and whether he might dispatch poison-spraying robot aircraft to attack the United States.
Both documents have been available to the public for months. The CIA released the public version, titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," in October 2002, when the Bush administration was making its case for war. The White House declassified and released portions of the NIE's key findings in July 2003.
Knight Ridder compared the documents in light of Tenet's speech and continuing controversy over the intelligence that President Bush used to justify the invasion last April. There are currently seven separate official inquiries into the issue.
What that comparison showed is that while the top-secret version delivered to Bush, his top lieutenants and Congress was heavily qualified with caveats about some of its most important conclusions about Iraq's illicit weapons programs, those caveats were omitted from the public version.
The caveats included the phases "we judge that," "we assess that" and "we lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs."
These phrases, according to current and former intelligence officials, long have been used in intelligence reports to stress an absence of hard information and underscore that judgments are extrapolations or estimates.
Among the most striking differences between the versions were those over Iraq's development of small, unmanned aircraft, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles.
The public version said Iraq's UAVs "especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents - could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland."
The classified version showed there was major disagreement on the issue from the agency with the greatest expertise on such aircraft, the Air Force. The Air Force "does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents," it said. "The small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability."
There was substantial difference between the public version of the estimate and the classified version on the issue of Iraq's biological weapons program.
The public version contained the alarming warning that Iraq was capable of quickly developing biological warfare agents that could be delivered by "bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland."
No such warning that Iraq's biological weapons could be delivered to United States appeared in the classified version.
In a section on chemical weapons, the top-secret findings said the intelligence community had "little specific information on Iraq's CW (chemical weapons) stockpile." That caveat was deleted from the public version.
The classified report went on to say that Iraq "probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents - much of it added last year."
"Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents," said the public report.
Deleted from the public version was a line in the classified report that cast doubt on whether Saddam was prepared to support terrorist attacks on the United States, a danger that Bush and his top aides raised repeatedly in making their case for war.
"Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington with a stronger case for making war," the top-secret report said.
Also missing from the public report were judgments that Iraq would attempt "clandestine attacks" on the United States only if an American invasion threatened the survival of Saddam's regime or "possibly for revenge."
Bush says Iraq may not have had WMD
Financial Times -- 9 February, 2004
By Guy Dinmore in Washington, Ben Hall in London and Judy Dempsey in Munich
President George W. Bush has acknowledged for the first time that Iraq might not have had stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, but denied that he led the US into war on false pretences.
Mr Bush, who is under domestic pressure to account for the apparent failure of US intelligence, gave a robust defence of his decision to go to war in an intense, hour-long interview broadcast on Monday on NBC's Meet the Press and recorded in the White House on Saturday.
Hans Blix criticises Iraqi WMD intelligence processes
ABC Online (Australia) -- 9 February, 2004
HANS BLIX: I think there was missing all the way through, from intelligence and from the governments, a critical thinking. They were so sure that Iraq had weapons, it was like a witch hunt.
If you are convinced that there are witches, and they were, then you take you every broom you see in a corner as evidence of the existence of the witches.
The 45-minute case collapses (Part 1)
JIC alerted Blair three times over unsafe WMD claim
The Independent -- 8 February 2004
By Andy McSmith Political Editor
Tony Blair was sent three intelligence reports in the six months during the run up to the Iraq war, including one that warned him that information on whether Saddam Hussein still held any chemical or biological weapons was "inconsistent" and "sparse".
Fischer say 'I told you so' -- but mildly
UPI via Washington Times -- February 8, 2004
MUNICH, Germany, Feb. 7 (UPI) -- Events in Iraq have proved Germany right in opposing the war, but Berlin wants to help in bringing peace, Foreign Minister Joscka Fischer declared Saturday.
"The Federal (German) Government feels that events have proven the position it took at the time to be right," Fischer told the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy. "It was our political decision not to join the coalition because we were not, and are still not convinced of the validity of the reasons for war."