James O. Young (2001): The sciences and the arts are not completely dissimilar forms of inquiry. Art and empirical science have a common foundation: both begin with careful observation. Before artists or scientists can represent anything they must observe aspects of the world. [...] The arts and sciences resemble each other in another respect. They both represent objects in such a way that, ideally, insight is provided into the objects represented. [...] The representations produced by the arts and sciences can each contribute to knowledge of some matter in two ways. That is, the representations these modes of inquiry produce have two cognitive functions. They may provide testimony about objects and they may interpret objects. Testimony is simply a record of observations. Interpretation is the attempt to understand this record, either by means of theories or in some other way. [...] Since arts and sciences employ different sorts of representation, they perform each of the cognitive functions in different ways.
Testimony: "We may identify semantic testimony and illustrative testimony.To provide testimony is simply to provide information. The sciences frequently provide information by means of statements. [...] The testimony in works of art, on the other hand, is provided by means of illustrations from which information can be derived. So, for example, a painting by Canaletto is testimony about the appearance of San Marco.
Canaletto, Piazza San Marco - Looking Southeast
(1735-40). Photo: Carol Gerten-Jackson [source]
Interpretation: "The sciences interpret objects by means of theories or models. The arts, on the other hand, do not. This is one of the fundamental differences between forms of inquiry which employ illustrative representation and those which employ semantic representation. Instead, the arts provide what I will call a perspective on objects. A perspective is a way of conceiving of an object that can enhance understanding of the object. [...] Both scientific theories and the perspectives provided by the arts are in need of justification. They ought not to be accepted on the word of a scientist or an artist. In other words, theories and perspectives need to be demonstrated and a great deal of what goes on in the arts and sciences is demonstration. An analysis of demonstration, and the form it takes in the arts, is an important part of the epistemology of art.
We need to begin by distinguishing between two quite different sorts of demonstration. I will call the first type illustrative deomonstration or showing. The second sort may be called rational demonstration. Rational demonstration is demonstration by means of an argument. Illustrative demonstration, on the other hand, is non-rational. ... [I]llustrative demonstration places one in a position where one can recognise something. Artworks cannot provide rational demonstrations of perspectives, but they can provide illustrative demonstrations of the rightness of a perspective.
Excerpts from James O. Young, Art and Knowledge (London and New York: Routledge, 2001) p. 66-69
I was given James O. Young's Art and Knowledge by a friend who told me "you will hate this guy, but you should read his book, because this is what's being said in philosophy of art." I found it frustrating, as it seems to take him forever to get to the point. But that might just be the way philosophy works; you gotta justify every remark before you can go on to the next one. I did find this passage, above, very helpful in distinguishing between ways of conveying meaning, or relevance. But I found myself wondering, what the heck do this guy's colleagues think? Is he even in the ballpark?
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wales, Bob Sharpe, responds to the book here. He disagrees with Young's basic point, which is that art has congitive value, explaining that this is an old idea and shows "the way in which philosophical theories never really die, they only become the undead." He also says, " I would not recommend it to a beginner in the philosophy of art; partly because it needs to be read with a healthy dose of counter-argument and beginners may not be that well-equipped," (which jives with my experience). Sharpe's main issue with Young seems to be based on the definition of 'cognitive,' Sharpe claiming that for something to have cognitive value it needs to present new information, which art does not necessarily do. Sharpe seems like less of an ass in his writing style, but I think I'd agree with Young on that point. Can't judge an idea by it's host-brain's personality! Sharpe does point out something embarrassing that I also caught: Young got the meaning of tromp-l'oeil wrong! Here's the passage: A perspective is a way of conceiving of an object that can enhance the understanding of the object. A simple example will clarify what I mean by perspective. Suppose someone is puzzled by a tromp-l'oeil and I point and say, 'If you see those things as the eyes, and those as the ears, you will see that it is a face.' In so saying and gesturing, I have provided the person with an interpretation of the painting. I have suggested that it be thought of as a face. I have, in other words, provided a perspective on the tromp-l'oeil.
I find this mistake kind of appalling. Tromp-l'oeil is a specialized term, for sure, but most elementary art history courses would cover it. It refers to painting so realistic that it could "trick your eye" into thinking it was real.
http://www.uqtr.uquebec.ca/AE/Vol_8/Young/watwe.html
Michael Watkins and Sheldon Wein eloquently demonstrate that James O. Young's core point "that only those works which have cognitive value ought to be defined as art," begins on very shakey ground. He contradicts himself and poses trite circular arguments. Watkins and Wein conclude: "There are lots of good things in Art and Knowledge—it is an eloquent work from which one can learn a great deal—but the account of what art is, or how we should define art, is, alas, not among them."
http://www.uqtr.uquebec.ca/AE/Vol_8/Young/newman.html
Ira Newman argues that Young's idea that characters in fiction refer to generalized personality types "is not sufficient to cover the full complement of ways in which our powers of conceptual reclassification grow under the influence of our experiences with fictional literature." In his essay, "The Hamlet of Albany," he offers the idea that fictional characters, such as Hamlet for example, can be viewed as "indivisible paradigms," and he quotes Aurthur C. Danto: "Who knows such people in real life? Next to them, people are pale and adimensional. They have a life of their own, and it is this to which we refer, I believe, when we speak of the reality of a character, or the reality of the world created by the fiction master. . . These are worlds alongside the real world, not worlds which have the world itself as model."
Article citation: Critical notice of James O. Young's Art and Knowledge in Canadian journal of philosophy. [ Can. j. philos.. ] , 2003 , vol. 33 , no 4 , pp. 575 - 598 by: MATHESON Carl , and KIRCHHOFF Evan
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James O. Young (2001): The sciences and the arts are not completely dissimilar forms of inquiry. Art and empirical science have a common foundation: both begin with careful observation. Before artists or scientists can represent anything they must observe aspects of the world. [...] The arts and sciences resemble each other in another respect. They both represent objects in such a way that, ideally, insight is provided into the objects represented. [...] The representations produced by the arts and sciences can each contribute to knowledge of some matter in two ways. That is, the representations these modes of inquiry produce have two cognitive functions. They may provide testimony about objects and they may interpret objects. Testimony is simply a record of observations. Interpretation is the attempt to understand this record, either by means of theories or in some other way. [...] Since arts and sciences employ different sorts of representation, they perform each of the cognitive functions in different ways.
Testimony: "We may identify semantic testimony and illustrative testimony.To provide testimony is simply to provide information. The sciences frequently provide information by means of statements. [...] The testimony in works of art, on the other hand, is provided by means of illustrations from which information can be derived. So, for example, a painting by Canaletto is testimony about the appearance of San Marco.
Canaletto, Piazza San Marco - Looking Southeast (1735-40). Photo: Carol Gerten-Jackson [source]
Interpretation: "The sciences interpret objects by means of theories or models. The arts, on the other hand, do not. This is one of the fundamental differences between forms of inquiry which employ illustrative representation and those which employ semantic representation. Instead, the arts provide what I will call a perspective on objects. A perspective is a way of conceiving of an object that can enhance understanding of the object. [...] Both scientific theories and the perspectives provided by the arts are in need of justification. They ought not to be accepted on the word of a scientist or an artist. In other words, theories and perspectives need to be demonstrated and a great deal of what goes on in the arts and sciences is demonstration. An analysis of demonstration, and the form it takes in the arts, is an important part of the epistemology of art.
We need to begin by distinguishing between two quite different sorts of demonstration. I will call the first type illustrative deomonstration or showing. The second sort may be called rational demonstration. Rational demonstration is demonstration by means of an argument. Illustrative demonstration, on the other hand, is non-rational. ... [I]llustrative demonstration places one in a position where one can recognise something. Artworks cannot provide rational demonstrations of perspectives, but they can provide illustrative demonstrations of the rightness of a perspective.
Excerpts from James O. Young, Art and Knowledge (London and New York: Routledge, 2001) p. 66-69
- sally mckay 1-19-2005 4:20 pm
I was given James O. Young's Art and Knowledge by a friend who told me "you will hate this guy, but you should read his book, because this is what's being said in philosophy of art." I found it frustrating, as it seems to take him forever to get to the point. But that might just be the way philosophy works; you gotta justify every remark before you can go on to the next one. I did find this passage, above, very helpful in distinguishing between ways of conveying meaning, or relevance. But I found myself wondering, what the heck do this guy's colleagues think? Is he even in the ballpark?
I find this mistake kind of appalling. Tromp-l'oeil is a specialized term, for sure, but most elementary art history courses would cover it. It refers to painting so realistic that it could "trick your eye" into thinking it was real.Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wales, Bob Sharpe, responds to the book here. He disagrees with Young's basic point, which is that art has congitive value, explaining that this is an old idea and shows "the way in which philosophical theories never really die, they only become the undead." He also says, " I would not recommend it to a beginner in the philosophy of art; partly because it needs to be read with a healthy dose of counter-argument and beginners may not be that well-equipped," (which jives with my experience). Sharpe's main issue with Young seems to be based on the definition of 'cognitive,' Sharpe claiming that for something to have cognitive value it needs to present new information, which art does not necessarily do. Sharpe seems like less of an ass in his writing style, but I think I'd agree with Young on that point. Can't judge an idea by it's host-brain's personality! Sharpe does point out something embarrassing that I also caught: Young got the meaning of tromp-l'oeil wrong! Here's the passage:
- sally mckay 1-19-2005 7:18 pm
http://www.uqtr.uquebec.ca/AE/Vol_8/Young/watwe.html
Michael Watkins and Sheldon Wein eloquently demonstrate that James O. Young's core point "that only those works which have cognitive value ought to be defined as art," begins on very shakey ground. He contradicts himself and poses trite circular arguments. Watkins and Wein conclude: "There are lots of good things in Art and Knowledge—it is an eloquent work from which one can learn a great deal—but the account of what art is, or how we should define art, is, alas, not among them."
http://www.uqtr.uquebec.ca/AE/Vol_8/Young/newman.html
Ira Newman argues that Young's idea that characters in fiction refer to generalized personality types "is not sufficient to cover the full complement of ways in which our powers of conceptual reclassification grow under the influence of our experiences with fictional literature." In his essay, "The Hamlet of Albany," he offers the idea that fictional characters, such as Hamlet for example, can be viewed as "indivisible paradigms," and he quotes Aurthur C. Danto: "Who knows such people in real life? Next to them, people are pale and adimensional. They have a life of their own, and it is this to which we refer, I believe, when we speak of the reality of a character, or the reality of the world created by the fiction master. . . These are worlds alongside the real world, not worlds which have the world itself as model."
Article citation: Critical notice of James O. Young's Art and Knowledge in Canadian journal of philosophy. [ Can. j. philos.. ] , 2003 , vol. 33 , no 4 , pp. 575 - 598 by: MATHESON Carl , and KIRCHHOFF Evan
- sally mckay 1-19-2005 8:20 pm